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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a mathematical model with appropriate assumptions, to model and to
determine the optimal group size for microfinance loans. An optimal size is defined to be
the size which maximizes the probability of no default of the group.
I INTRODUCTION
Microfinance analyzes the lending mechanisms for people without access to traditional credit
systems because of their low income, lack of collateral, or credit history. There are many
lending mechanisms studied in the literature, but we will focus on group lending, which was
introduced by Muhammad Yunus of the Grameen bank in Bangledesh. He won the Nobel
Peace Prize (2006) for his efforts. In this mechanism, a loan is made to all members of the
group for a fixed period of time (often less than a year).
One of the crucial components of group lending is known as contingent renewal, which is a
penalty that eliminates or reduces access to future loans to all members in a group if any of
them defaults. This is to say, the default of at least one individual provokes the default of
the group. Note that by default of a member we mean that she stops paying her share of
the loan. The group lending mechanism is thought to be useful because it induces: (i) peer
selection of members in a group since they are better informed than the lender about other
potential borrowers, (ii) peer pressure to help enforce payments by other members in the
group, and (iii) peer monitoring between the group members, but particularly by a leader,
to ensure continued performance on the loan. In this paper, we will focus on modeling the
last element of the previous list. See the articles Diener at al. [9], Diener and Mauk [10],
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and Diener at al. [11], for a study of the consequences of implementing various penalties for
default.
The existing academic literature primarily focuses on understanding why the group lend-
ing mechanism is successful in reducing defaults. Both static and dynamic models have
been analyzed (see Stiglitz [17]; Varian [19]; Conlin [5]; Morduch [14]; Chowdhury [6], [7];
Tedeschi [18]). A related and somewhat unexplored issue is to determine an optimal group
size. We define optimal size as the one that maximizes the probability of no default of the
group. Obviously, there are other important factors in the calculation of the default of a
group, including – especially – the personalities of the members of the group, local traditions,
a cultural sense of responsibility, and the like. We choose to focus, in this work, exclusively
on the size.
The problem of an optimal group size has been analyzed by economists in the past (see
Armenda´riz and Morduch [3]; Gine´ et al. [12]; Ahlin [1], [2]). Most of them take an intuitive,
experimental and, often verbal approach. In contrast, ours is more probabilistic in nature,
and thereby quantifiable. A first approach to what we present here is the article of Jarrow
and Protter [13]. We also note that the problem of group size has been tackled using tools
from Game Theory (see Rezaei et al. [16]).
An outline for this paper is as follows. Section II presents the model and our main theorem,
while Section III outlines an interpretation for it. Section IV shows an example and discusses
its intuitiveness, and Section V concludes.
II THE MODEL
Caveats: We begin with a few caveats. Different scenarios of Microlending have been
considered in the academic literature. For example, there is the issue of the size of the loan
affecting the group in group lending, and in particular its size (with larger loans leading to
somewhat larger groups, see Rezaei [16]). In this paper, the loan size is fixed, and we will
not consider its influence on the group size. Some researchers take as their point of view the
maximization of the profits of the lending institution (see, e.g., Bourjade and Schindele [4]).
This runs counter to the spirit embraced in M. Yunus book [20], and again, while a valid
consideration, it is not our concern in this paper. We are concerned only with minimizing
the possibility of default on the loan; admittedly this is related to maximizing the profits
of the lender, along with the interest rates charged (see Jarrow and Protter [13]). Finally,
we mention that we do not discuss the transaction costs of banks, and what the effect of
group lending is on them. We also implicitly assume that the members of a given group
form a fairly homogeneous collection of people (see Devereux and Fishe [8], later echoed in
Bourjade and Schindele [4].) This homogeneity assumption is reflected in our assumption of
identical distributions, within a group of a given size, allowing the distributions to change
with the group size.
We now introduce the notation for our model. Let Ni be the event of no default of member
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i in a group of size k (k ∈ Z+, k ≥ 2), Nk be the event that the group of size k does not
default and, ϕ(k) := 1 − Pk (N1), i.e., the probability of default of member 1 in a group of
size k. Recall that, as explained in the introduction, the group lending mechanism implies
that if at least one member of the group defaults, then the whole group defaults. This is
what we call default of a group.
We make the following assumptions:
1. For fixed size k, the group members are independent and identically distributed.
2. The probability of no default of one person depends on the size of the group. We make
this explicit by writing: Pk (N1).
3. Pk(N1) > 0. Otherwise the problem is trivial as the members will default for sure.
We are interested in finding an optimal group size, that is, finding the number of people k∗
that maximizes the probability of no default of the group. Using our assumptions, along
with our definition of default of a group, this translates into maximizing:
P (Nk) = P
(
k⋂
i=1
Ni
)
= [Pk (N1)]
k = (1− ϕ(k))k (1)
For a moment, suppose that ϕ(·) is constant in k, hence as ϕ(·) < 1, (1− ϕ(·))k decreases
as k increases. So, in order to have a maxima in (1), it makes sense to require that 1−ϕ(k)
increases with k, which means that ϕ(k) needs to decrease with k. The question is then, at
what speed? This motivates the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ(x) = 1
f(x)
, for all x ∈ R+ If:
1. f(x) > 1 for all x ≥ 2
2. f(x) ∈ C2
3. f ′(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 2
4. There exist a, b ∈ R (a < b, a ≥ 2) such that either:
(a) f(a)− af ′(a) = 1
2
and f(b)− bf ′(b) = 1
and
(b) f ′′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (a, b),
or
(a) f(a)− af ′(a) = 1 and f(b)− bf ′(b) = 1
2
and
(b) f ′′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (a, b)
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Then (1− ϕ(x))x has a unique maximizer x∗ in (a, b). Moreover, if a, b are unique, then x∗
is the unique maximizer.
Proof. Let S(x) :=
∑
∞
n=0
(
1
n+1
) (
1
n+2
) (
1
f(x)
)n
Note:
• S(x) is a decreasing function in x.
• S(x) ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
, for all x ∈ R because:
1
2
<
1
2
+
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n+ 1
)(
1
n+ 2
)(
1
f(x)
)n
= S(x) <
∞∑
n=0
(
1
n+ 1
)(
1
n + 2
)
= 1
Set h(x) := f(x) − xf ′(x) and note that in (a, b), h(x) is a monotone function because of
condition (4b). More explicitly:
h′(x) = f ′(x)− [f ′(x) + xf ′′(x)] = −xf ′′(x) > 0 (or < 0) for all x ∈ (a, b)
Moreover, the monotonicity of h(x) and condition (4a) imply 1
2
< h(x) < 1 for all x ∈ (a, b)
In this way for all x ∈ (a, b):
• Both S(x) and h(x) are continuous and monotone
• S(x) is bounded between
(
1
2
, 1
)
. This actually holds for all x ∈ R+
• h(x) increases from 1
2
to 1 (or decreases from 1 to 1
2
)
Then there exists a unique x∗ ∈ (a, b) such that
h(x∗) = S(x∗) (2)
We shall see that this x∗ is actually the unique maximizer. Thanks to equation (2), we have:
f(x∗)− x∗f ′(x∗) =
∞∑
n=0
(
1
n+ 1
)(
1
n+ 2
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n
⇐⇒ 0 =
∞∑
n=0
(
1
n+ 1
)(
1
n+ 2
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n
+ x∗f ′(x∗)− f(x∗)
=
∞∑
n=0
(
1
n+ 1
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n
−
∞∑
n=0
(
1
n + 2
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n
+ x∗f ′(x∗)− f(x∗)
=
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n−1
−
∞∑
n=2
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n−2
− f(x∗) + x∗f ′(x∗)
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=
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n−1
−
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n−2
+ x∗f ′(x∗)
=
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n+1
−
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x∗)
)n
+
x∗f ′(x∗)
(f(x∗))2
(3)
Now, recall we want to find a maxima for (1− ϕ(x))x. This is equivalent to maximizing
U(x) := x ln (1− ϕ(x)).
Note U ′(x) = ln (1− ϕ(x))− x
1−ϕ(x)
ϕ′(x)
It suffices to find x∗ (the maximizer) such that U ′(x∗) = 0, which is equivalent to g(x∗) = 0
where g(x) := [1− ϕ(x)] ln (1− ϕ(x))− xϕ′(x)
Recall: ln(1− y) = −
∑
∞
n=1
yn
n
, if |y| < 1. Then:
g(x) = [1− ϕ(x)]
[
−
∞∑
n=1
ϕn(x)
n
]
− xϕ′(x)
=
∞∑
n=1
ϕn+1(x)
n
−
∞∑
n=1
ϕn(x)
n
− xϕ′(x)
=
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x)
)n+1
−
∞∑
n=1
(
1
n
)(
1
f(x)
)n
+ x
f ′(x)
(f(x))2
Finally, it is easy to see that this last line and (3) imply g(x∗) = 0 and we can conclude x∗ is
the unique maximizer in (a, b). If a, b are unique, it is clear that the maximizer is unique.
Remark. The terms (4a) and (4b), which may seem mysterious at first glance, are inspired
by Taylor’s Theorem, from calculus.
One can argue that, in the previous theorem, we heavily used the continuity of f(x) and the
fact that x ∈ R+ and, as we are optimizing with respect to the number of people, we should
have taken k ∈ Z, but we can always round x∗ to the closest integer to get k∗.
III INTERPRETATION OF THE THEOREM
Recall formula (1) P (Nk) = P
(⋂k
i=1Ni
)
= [Pk (N1)]
k = (1− ϕ(k))k. As we briefly discussed
in section (II), because of our independence and identical distribution assumptions, there
are 2 interacting forces affecting P(Nk). On the one hand, P(Nk) = (1− ϕ (k))
k decreases as
k increases because 0 < ϕ(k) < 1. On the other hand, we set a fortiori ϕ(k) to decrease as
k increases with the hope to find a maximizer k∗. Lending to a group has advantages over
lending to an individual, but as the size of the group increases, the advantages diminish and
tend to zero. There should, therefore, be some happy (and optimal) compromise of a group
size being big, but not too big!
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There are two opposing forces here. As the group size increases, the responsibility for
performing one’s tasks becomes dispersed, increasing the likelihood that one or more member
of the group may default. Typically, there will be a leader or primary organizer, the force
behind the loan, and she will need to ride herd on the other members, keeping them in line,
if need be. The larger the group, the more diffused her efforts will be, and therefore the
less effective. In our model, this is captured by ϕ(k) as different functions give different
“peer pressure levels/intensities” and hence different k∗ (optimal group size). On the other
hand, as the group size contracts, each person becomes more important, making it harder
to recover from a mistake, or a temporary period of misfortune. In the limit case of only one
borrower, lenders in Ghana (for example) have found that, there being no peer pressure at
all, the borrower has a serious probability of simply absconding with the money. [15]
Mathematically, as the group size increases, because of our assumptions, there are more
independent chances of failure as it is riskier to have k + 1 possible defaults than k. This
causes P(Nk) to decrease as k increases. Note that the effect of this force is free of the choice
of ϕ(k).
Now, the issue is to find the right speed of decay of ϕ(k). This is addressed by our theorem.
It is important to note that our theorem is useful because not all ϕ(k) work. One can check,
for example, that the seemingly natural choice of ϕ(k) = 1
k
does not have a finite maximizer
greater or equal to 2.
IV EXAMPLE
In this section, we provide a function that satisfies our theorem and whose maximizer is
close to 5, i.e. x∗ ≈ 5. As explained in Banker To The Poor (1998), this is the group size
proposed by Muhammad Yunus. Let us consider the following choice of the function f :
f(x) = xp + [ln x]
1
p for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(4)
This example captures two different forces at play. The part of f(x) given by xp represents the
leader’s ability to influence the group’s performance, while the component [ln x]
1
p represents
the quality of the group at play. We chose ln x, which has a distinctly slower growth rate
than x, for quality of the group because we think that this is less relevant than the leader’s
ability.
The exponents of x and of ln x are chosen in this way because we want to have opposite
forces for the interaction of the leader and the group. That is, the less effective the leader is,
the better group quality we need. For simplicity, it makes sense to chose p and its reciprocal.
The cases p = 1
2
and p = 1 are relevant as they lead to x∗ = 5.13 and x∗ = 4.62 respectively.
Therefore, in the extreme cases, i.e., either an excellent leader or a high-quality group, the
optimal group size is 5.
We wish to note that, although f(x) = xp, for all p ∈ (1/2, 1) works, we believe this function
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does not capture the complexity of the situation we are trying to model. For this function,
when p is close to 1, eg. p = 0.999, the maximizer is x∗ = 503.45. This should not
be surprising as x0.999 is close to x, which as previously discussed does not have a finite
maximizer. Moreover, when p is close to 1/2, e.g. p = 0.501, x∗ = 1.956
Now, we show that the example given in (4) satisfies the conditions of the theorem.
Conditions 1 and 2 are immediate.
Condition (3): f ′(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 2
Proof of (3): f ′(x) = pxp−1 + 1
p
(
1
x
)
(ln x)
1
p
−1 As x ≥ 2, it is clear f ′(x) > 0
Condition (4a): There exist a and b such that f(a)− af ′(a) = 1
2
and f(b)− bf ′(b) = 1
Proof of (4a):
Set hp(x) := f(x)−xf ′(x) = xp+(ln x)
1
p−pxp− 1
p
(ln x)
1
p
−1 = (1−p)xp+(ln x)
1
p
−1
(
ln x− 1
p
)
Claim: hp(x) is increasing in x
Proof of claim:
∂
∂x
hp(x) = (1− p)pxp−1 +
(
1
p
− 1
)
(ln x)
1
p
−2
[
lnx− 1
p
]
1
x
+ 1
x
(ln x)
1
p
−1
It is clear (1− p) pxp−1 > 0. So, it suffices to show(
1
p
− 1
)
(ln x)
1
p
−2
[
ln x−
1
p
]
1
x
+
1
x
(ln x)
1
p
−1 ≥ 0 (5)
For reasons that will become clear later, we only consider x ≥ e. As ln x + 1 ≥ 2 and
1 ≤ 1
p
≤ 2, it follows that
ln x+ 1 ≥
1
p
1
p
(
ln x+ 1−
1
p
)
≥ 0
1
p
(
ln x−
1
p
)
−
(
ln x−
1
p
)
+ ln x ≥ 0(
1
p
− 1
)(
ln x−
1
p
)
+ ln x ≥ 0
This shows (5) and thus that hp(x) is increasing for x ≥ e
Claim: hp(e) = (1 − p)ep + 1 −
1
p
is concave in p and hence there exists a local maxima,
namely p∗. (Recall 1
2
≤ p ≤ 1)
Proof of claim:
∂
∂p
hp(e) = −ep + (1− p)ep +
1
p2
= −pep + 1
p2
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∂2
∂p2
hp(e) = −e
p − pep − 2
p3
< 0 =⇒ hp(e) is concave
Now, to find the maxima, we set the derivative equal to 0, i.e. ∂
∂p
hp(e) = 0
0 = −pep +
1
p2
1 = p3ep
1 = pe
1
3
p
Set u = 1
3
p, we need to solve ueu = 1
3
, which we do by using the product logarithm.
Hence u = W
(
1
3
)
and thus p∗ = 3W
(
1
3
)
≈ 0.772883 =⇒ hp(e)|p=0.773 ≈ 0.1981 <
1
2
Claim: hp(e) <
1
2
for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
Proof of claim:
As we have shown that hp(e) is concave in p and that hp∗(e) ≈ 0.1981 <
1
2
, it follows that
hp(e) <
1
2
for all p ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
We only need to check the endpoints, hp(e)|p= 1
2
≈ −0.1756 and hp(e)|p=1 = 0
Hence hp(e) <
1
2
for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. This, along with hp(x) being continuous, increasing
in x ≥ e and limx→∞ hp(x) = ∞, imply that there exists a such that hp(a) =
1
2
and that
a ≥ e ≈ 2.7⇒ a ≥ 3
Claim: hp(e
2) = (1− p)e2p + 2
1
p
−1
(
1− 1
p
)
is concave in p
Proof of claim:
∂
∂p
hp(e
2) = −e2p + 2(1− p)e2p +
(
1
p3
− 2
p2
)
(ln 2)2
1
p
−1 +
(
1
p2
)
2
1
p
−1
∂2
∂p2
hp(e
2) = −4e2p + 4(1− p)e2p − 2
1
p 1
p3
+ 2
1
p
(
2− 1
p
)
ln 2
p3
− 2
1
p ln 2
p4
+ 2
1
p
−1
(
2− 1
p
)
(ln 2)2
p4
Now we show that ∂
2
∂p2
hp(e
2) < 0
1. It is clear that −4e2p + 4(1− p)e2p < 0
2. As ln 2 < 1 and 2− 1
p
≤ 1
(
2−
1
p
)
ln 2 < 1
−1 +
(
2−
1
p
)
ln 2 < 0
−2
1
p
1
p3
+ 2
1
p
(
2−
1
p
)
ln 2
p3
< 0
8
3. Similarly (
2−
1
p
)
ln 2
2
< 1
−1 +
(
2−
1
p
)
ln 2
2
< 0
2
1
p
ln 2
p4
+ 2
1
p
−1
(
2−
1
p
)
(ln 2)2
p4
< 0
Claim: hp(e
2) ≥ 1 for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
Proof of claim:
As we have shown that hp(e
2) is concave in p, it suffices to show hp(e
2)|p= 1
2
≥ 1 and
hp(e
2)|p=1 ≥ 1
1. hp(e
2)|p= 1
2
= 1
2
e > 1 as e > 2
2. hp(e
2)|p=1 = 1
Hence hp(e
2) ≥ 1 for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. This, along with hp(x) being continuous and increasing
in x implies that there exists b such that hp(b) = 1 and that b ≤ e2 ≈ 7.4⇒ b ≤ 7
Condition (4b): f ′′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (a, b) for some a, b > 0 such that e ≤ a < b
Proof of (4b):
f ′′(x) = p(p− 1)xp−2 + 1
p
[(
1−p
p
) (
1
x
)2
(ln x)
1
p
−2 −
(
1
x
)2
(ln x)
1
p
−1
]
= p(p− 1)xp−2 + 1
p
(
1
x
)2
(ln x)
1
p
−2
[
1−p
p
− ln x
]
1. p(p− 1)xp−2 ≤ 0 because, by assumption p ≤ 1.
2. By assumption 1 ≤ 1
p
≤ 2 and as ln x+ 1 ≥ 2 for x ≥ e, we get 1
p
≤ ln x + 1 . Hence,
1−p
p
− ln x ≤ 0, which implies the 2nd term is non-positive for all x ≥ e
Hence for f(x) = xp + [ln x]
1
p , using our theorem, we can claim that the maximizer x∗ ∈
[3, 7] for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. It is worth noticing that for this particular f(x), we can obtain a
narrower interval in the following way:
To find the maximizer x∗ of (1− ϕ(x))x, we need to set the derivative equal to 0, which, as
noted in the proof of the theorem, is equivalent to solving [1− ϕ(x)] ln (1− ϕ(x))−xϕ′(x) =
0. Using ϕ(x) = 1
f(x)
= 1
xp+[lnx]1/p
, let us define:
H(x, p) : = [1− ϕ(x)] ln (1− ϕ(x))− xϕ′(x)
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=(
1−
1
xp + [ln x]
1
p
)
ln
(
1−
1
xp + [ln x]
1
p
)
+
p2xp lnx+ (ln x)
1
p
p ln x
[
xp + (ln x)
1
p
]2
Then, after fixing p, we need to find x such that H(x, p) = 0
Note H(x, p) is decreasing in x for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. Hence, for fixed p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
and for all x ≤
3.48, we have H(x, p) ≥ H(3.48, p), which implies
min
p
H(x, p) ≥ min
p
H(3.48, p)
By calculations, we know:
min
p
H(3.48, p) = H(3.48, 0.77) ≈ 0.00019 > 0
Hence, joining the 2 previous inequalities, we have for all x ≤ 3.48 and for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
H(x, p) ≥ min
p
H(x, p) ≥ min
p
H(3.48, p) > 0
This implies that H(x, p) = 0 does not have a solution when x ≤ 3.48 and p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. So, x∗
must be in the interval (3.48,∞).
As H(x, p) is decreasing in x, H(x, p) ≤ H(5.4, p) for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
and for all x ≥ 5.4.
Moreover, H(5.4, p) ≤ maxpH(5.4, p) = H(5.4, 1) ≈ −0.003 < 0. Joining these 2 facts, we
get for all x ≥ 5.4 and for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
:
H(x, p) ≤ H(5.4, p) ≤ max
p
H(5.4, p) < 0
This implies that H(x, p) = 0 does not have a solution when x ≥ 5.4 and p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. So, x∗
must be in (0, 5.4)
Joining the 2 previous statements about the location of the maximizer, we finally get a
narrower interval x∗ ∈ (3.48, 5.4) for all p ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
By numerical calculations, we can see that when p ∈ [0.5, 0.539] or p ∈ [0.993, 1], x∗ ∈
[4.5, 5.5), giving an integer maximizer of 5, which coincides with the maximizer proposed by
Muhammad Yunus.
V CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a theoretical model for the determination of the optimal number of
people in a group loan. As these loans are intended for low-income borrowers with little
or no collateral, and with no credit history, one of the starting points to maximize the
repayment rate is to determine the best possible size of the group. An empirical study of
the proposed model awaits subsequent research.
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